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Synopsis
This review-essay on the mother-and-daughter collaboration Math on Trial stems
from my recent experience using this book as the basis for a college freshman
seminar on the interactions between math and law. I discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of this book as an accessible introduction to this enigmatic yet deeply
important topic. For those considering teaching from this text (a highly recom-
mended endeavor) I offer some curricular suggestions.
Math on Trial: How Numbers Get Used and Abused in
the Courtroom. By Leila Schneps and Coralie Colmez, Basic
Books, NY, 2013. (US$26.99, ISBN-10: 0465032923. 272 pages.)
1. Introduction
The phrase “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” has developed into a pillar
of many judicial systems worldwide (see [16] for an engaging history in the
American context). Despite the ubiquity of these words and the cultural
significance enshrining them, there is an inherent paradoxical vacuity here:
reasonable doubt has only the meaning that we subjectively, and mercurially,
impart to it. One might argue that it is indeed the inexorable flexibility of
these words that renders them so powerful. Put another way, it is the lack of
precise meaning that makes the concept of reasonable doubt so meaningful.
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Although we cannot, and should not, confine reasonable doubt to any
rigid axiomatic system, we may nonetheless assert that the expression “guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt” is plausibly tantamount to an estimation that
the probability of innocence, although impossible to eliminate entirely, is
quite small. The devil remains in the details, as this probability is generally
ill-defined, to put it mildly, and even a crude attempt at quantification leads
one to wonder how small a probability of innocence suffices to convict. Thus,
a statistical interpretation does not eliminate the ambiguity central to the
phrase, but it does move the conversation into a new pseudo-mathematical
realm.
This perspective, that the central question facing a criminal courtroom is
in essence a probabilistic one, naturally leads one to wonder whether statistics
could be used to uncover truth in the legal setting as it has throughout the
20th century in the scientific realm [12]. As it turns out, experimentation
with this idea, and debate regarding its efficacy and ethical implications, has
been playing out in our courtrooms since the late 19th century as well as in
academic legal journals, most prominently in a series of Harvard Law Review
articles from the early 1970s [6, 7, 14, 15]. Far from an obscure intellectual
pursuit, the relevance of this discourse has grown rapidly over the years and
is now nearly unavoidable; for instance, any legal consideration based on
biological forensics, such as DNA identification, ultimately relies on subtle
statistical underpinnings [1].
The book under review, Math on Trial: How Numbers Get Used and
Abused in the Courtroom by Schneps and Colmez, provides a gentle intro-
duction to this engrossing topic by presenting a handful of legal cases, historic
and recent and some quite well-known for non-mathematical reasons, where
mathematics, usually in the form of probabilistic estimates in lieu of more
traditional evidence, played a prominent role. The authors do not directly
broach the difficult academic debate on mathematics’ broader applicability
in the courtroom, but through examples and innovative elementary lessons
they illustrate many pitfalls to be aware of when applying statistical rea-
soning to jurisprudence—and strikingly, some wrenching travesties that have
befallen an unlucky few due to an overzealous use of misunderstood or mis-
leading mathematics. In short, the book is a series of captivating criminal
cases paired with accessibly presented and well-focused math lessons. Alto-
gether, the authors proffer a compelling argument that we, as a society, can
reduce the incidence of judicial error and abuse related to courtroom statis-
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tics by striving to increase our collective mathematical literacy—and they
deftly take an admirable step in this direction with this publication.
There are a few weaknesses of the book, however. At times the authors
fall into the very mathematical traps they warn the reader about, and the
legal considerations are consistently treated more superficially than the math-
ematical ones. In addition, there are occasions where an easily discernible
bias creeps in to the narrative, most prominently in the chapter on the con-
troversial Amanda Knox case. Nonetheless, the moral of Math on Trial is
that we should be an informed and skeptical public, especially when it comes
to quantitative courtroom reasoning, and with this in mind an astute reader
can even take pleasure in locating and privately rebutting the book’s minor
flaws. Moreover, it is not difficult to find and consult earlier literature on the
cases and mathematical issues discussed in this book in order to see other
perspectives on the matter.
The very fact that a book which sets out to resolve the ambiguity sur-
rounding murkily applied mathematics is unable to do so consistently shows
how quixotic the entire venture is. Even experts will continue to disagree
on the appropriateness and accuracy of mathematics as applied to the lim-
itlessly confounding situations facing a courtroom, so in the end awareness
of the general challenges is as important, if not more so, as correctness in
any particular situation. In this way the book provides a wonderful peda-
gogical platform: students can learn much from what is presented accurately
in this book, and they will learn just as much by debating and debunking
what they find dubious. In short, the fundamental vagueness surrounding
the phrase “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” pervades the entire discipline
of jurisprudence based on statistical reasoning, and it is therefore not surpris-
ing that any particular attempt to set the record straight mathematically, as
the present book strives to do, will ultimately fall short but will nonetheless
leave the reader more informed and aware of the extraordinarily important,
and endlessly fascinating, issues involved.
2. What’s in the book
The structure of the book is appealingly straightforward: aside from a
very brief introduction and conclusion, it consists of ten chapters, each de-
scribing a particular legal case (with dates ranging from the late 19th century
up until just a few years ago) and each beginning with a short but relevant
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and easily digestible math lesson. The majority of these cases involve a sta-
tistical argument, such as a probabilistic estimate that the defendant matches
some forensic evidence or an eye-witness description, and typically this sta-
tistical argument is either improperly constructed or outright baseless. The
accompanying math lesson is then a simplified illustration in a hypothetical
situation to clarify the problematic reasoning. In many but not all such cases,
the legal decision reached using such faulty reasoning was later appealed and
ultimately rejected by a higher court, often after unbelievable and unbearable
hardship on the unfairly accused. The book excellently engenders sympathy
for those falsely convicted and takes a laudable position of advocacy that we
must increase mathematical literacy in order to prevent the reoccurrence of
such judicial travesties.
The cases are, to an extent, ordered so that the corresponding mathemat-
ical issues build in complexity; sometimes the order also reflects a layering
of mathematical issues. That being said, the earlier cases can in some ways
be the most challenging to fully digest and reconcile. This is because when
the math itself is most bare, the controversy then arises from its interpreta-
tion, and therein lie murky waters. As an example, Chapter 2 presents a case
(now famous in the literature on mathematical jurisprudence, e.g., it features
prominently in those aforementioned Harvard Law Review articles) where
an eye-witness testified to a collection of physical traits that the defendant
mostly matched and, although each trait was not uncommon in isolation, the
combination of them all in tandem was deemed exceedingly rare. The con-
crete math errors highlighted here are twofold: (1) these events, such as being
a beard-wearing African-American and wearing a mustache, were treated as
independent when by intuition or any statistical measure they quite mani-
festly are not, and (2) the “estimates” given in court for the probabilities of
the individual events were completely unjustified (if not altogether racist).
The cleverly simple example the authors use to illustrate the first math er-
ror, which is the topic of Chapter 1 though in a far different guise, is the
following: the probability that two children born are both male is 1
2
· 1
2
= 1
4
,
but if they are identical twins then their genders are completely dependent
and the probability of two males rises to 1
2
.
This false assumption of independence results in a vast overestimate of the
rarity of the joint occurrence of the physical traits which was used to argue
the near certainty that the defendant was indeed the person described by the
witness; this, in turn, formed the basis for a conviction. Although this false
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assumption of independence and the fairly arbitrary individual probabilities
asserted are central to the misuse of mathematics in this case and are wor-
thy of careful explanation and illustration, as the authors dutifully provide,
the subtler issue is how to interpret the probability of joint occurrence thus
obtained. Indeed, one could imagine replacing the individual probabilities
with conservative estimates, to compensate for their apparent arbitrariness,
and adjusting the model to incorporate a generous degree of mutual depen-
dence in order to obtain a probability that is perhaps still small enough to
convince the jury of its rarity while at the same time less patently biased—
but then how does one proceed in the judicial process with this information?
Even if one accepts a statistical argument that the particular constellation
of characteristics described by the witness seldom occurs even in a very large
population, and that the defendant matches this description (which, as the
court records show, wasn’t entirely the case), the probative force of such an
assertion is extremely difficult to assess.
The authors content themselves with a somewhat brief discussion of this
latter point at the conclusion of their chapter, drawn largely from Tribe’s
article [14] where a more in-depth analysis is provided. Thus, by emphasizing
the concrete issue of statistical dependence and unjustified estimates, they
relegate this more complex interpretative issue to a somewhat tangential
role, even though it may arguably be the deeper and more important one.
In fairness, the book would likely be less readable and lose narrative flow
if each case were given a detailed analysis covering the myriad complexities
associated with statistical jurisprudence, rather than isolating manageable
issues and building upon them through the chapters. So my comments here
are less a criticism of the organization of the book than a warning to the
reader that, although the math itself may seem more straightforward in the
opening chapters, the interpretations and judicial applications are anything
but straightforward. In general, the fundamental challenges in statistical
jurisprudence come from these more open-ended issues of construal—they
pose, indubitably, the problems that do not materially vanish when errors
are avoided—and the cases in the early chapters are rife with these.
At the opposite extreme, the final chapter of the book focuses on the well-
known Dreyfus affair. Although this case, dealing with anti-Semitism and
delicate turn-of-the-century geopolitical issues, has been discussed at length
in both academic and public spheres due to its historical significance [2, 11],
Math on Trial brings attention to an important but sometimes neglected
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component of the story: the reliance of the prosecution on “mathematical”
arguments. Here the math, as it were, is an artifice fabricated by desperate
accusers to be so impenetrably elaborate that it must be taken on faith;
there is no genuine challenge of interpretation as in the early chapters, nor
any simple and avoidable conceptual or computational errors, there is only
a senseless witch-hunt with an outlandish cryptological argument buttressed
by mathematical maneuvering to intimidate the audience and obfuscate the
lack of real evidence in the case.
The mathematical aspects of this case were not a novel discovery (see
[9]), but the wise inclusion of this chapter in the book accomplishes multiple
worthwhile goals regardless. This chapter brings further attention to this
bizarre yet important aspect of the case, it adds diversity to the types of
cases presented in the book, and it lends further support to the overarching
arguments of the book. Indeed, by emphasizing the mathematical aspects of
this saga the authors provide an excellent lesson that math, while ultimately
predicated on the search for universal truth, can in the wrong hands be a
tool for precisely the opposite, namely deception and dishonesty, and thereby
unscrupulous coercion. Once again the unremitting message of Math on Trial
comes to the fore, and rightly so: the best way to disarm math as a villainous
device is to better educate the citizenry in quantitative reasoning and thereby
render us impervious to mathematical intimidation.
Although the math in the Dreyfus affair has a distinct flavor from that of
the previous chapters, it is nonetheless an attempt at prosecutorial arguments
based on statistical considerations and evidence. The chapter in the book
that is the most dissimilar from the others, in that it involves no statistics
whatsoever, is Chapter 8, which discusses another famous historical incident,
though not specifically a legal trial, per se. Here the story is that of Charles
Ponzi and his now legendary and eponymous scheme. Plenty of amusing
details on Ponzi’s biography and personality complement the highlighted
mathematical issue, the untrammeled speed of exponential growth. The
math here is quite elementary and, while nicely illustrated in a simplified
model, entirely straightforward. Since this is the case, and there are really
no legal issues at play, or at least none discussed in this book, the main
contributions of this chapter, I feel, are a break from the pattern of improper
statistical jurisprudence cases leading up to this chapter, and a well-placed
levity. Many of the cases in the book are evocatively recounted and so deeply
disturbing and tragic, both in terms of the crimes/accidents that occurred
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and the miscarriages of justice (some of which, at least in retrospect, seem
so easily avoided), that it is hard not to develop a heavy heart while reading,
even if one’s goal is simply to absorb the legal and mathematical issues
arising. With respect to the singular Ponzi, on the other hand, at the risk
of sounding callous I would say that one cannot help but feel amused and
entertained by this financial debacle, especially as it is colorfully told here,
despite the desperate economic times surrounding, and in part enabling, it.
The cases in the book are very well chosen to keep the reader informed
and captivated. There is not a dull moment; in every chapter I found the
legal situations fascinating, or the mathematical ones, and most often both
in parallel. My personal favorite mathematical issue highlighted in the book
comes in Chapter 5. Here the famous “birthday paradox” in basic probability
theory—which is, roughly, the observation that although it is fairly uncom-
mon to meet someone with your birthday, it is surprisingly common to find
two individuals in a small group of people with the same birthday—plays out
in fantastic clarity in the legal setting. A defense team, while trying to rebut
forensic evidence against their client, presented literature showing that the
FBI’s established probability of random DNA matches could not possibly be
correct because in even a small collection of samples they found a handful of
matches. As Schneps and Colmez accurately explain, the confusion here is
precisely the birthday paradox: the probability of finding a match between
any two DNA samples in a database is orders of magnitude greater than the
probability of finding a match with a fixed sample (that of the defendant,
for instance), because if there are n samples then the former involves test-
ing
(
n
2
)
= n(n−1)
2
pairs of samples. In the case at hand, it was the latter
that was relevant, so this chapter is one of the rare instances where it was
the defense, rather than the prosecution, that misunderstood and misapplied
mathematics.
Finally, while attempting not to give away too much content—many of
the cases really are page-turners!—I cannot resist mentioning that my over-
all favorite case in the book is that of Chapter 9. Here a large inheritance
was at stake in 19th century New England, the will prescribing this inheri-
tance was disputed, and the claimant was a remarkable woman of unbridled
eccentricity—and ultimately, the richest woman in America at the time. The
legal case came down almost entirely to determining the authenticity of a pair
of quill pen signatures on the will (makes one nostalgic for the simplicity of
such bygone eras, no?). The story itself is truly Dickensian, except for a
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rather uncommon plot twist: a famous mathematician, one whose name still
reverberates in the walls of the Harvard math department, was called in to
testify and argue the case against the claimant.
Benjamin Peirce, working as an expert witness, developed a binomial
model—at a time when statistical modeling was still in its infancy—to esti-
mate the likelihood of signature forgery. The idea was that forged signatures
would display an uncanny degree of similarity, and indeed the pair on the dis-
puted will appeared nearly identical, so by measuring the similarity between
a collection of signatures found on various documents in the late matriarch’s
estate, Peirce would develop a model for predicting the relative frequency of
a pair of signatures matching to any specified degree. Of the 42 signatures
he tested none came close to matching as flawlessly as the disputed ones did,
but the data provided by these
(
42
2
)
= 861 sample pairs allowed him to fit the
parameters of his binomial model (tedious manual labor, no doubt) which
was then used to extrapolate the likelihood of extreme events. He concluded
that the probability of a near perfect match as exhibited on the disputed
will was astronomically small—the Victorian language used to describe such
a minuscule number was far more elaborate and visceral than anything I
could possibly attempt here—and could therefore be considered so unlikely
a coincidence that it must be the result of duplicity. Ingenious.
Many fascinating and subtle details, well told in the book, arise concern-
ing this model. For instance, Peirce’s model empirically seemed a reasonable
fit for a range of parameters but was noticeably deficient in estimating the
tails of the distribution—and the conclusion he asserted rests entirely upon
the fit at the tails. Moreover, the 42 sample signatures were produced over
many years, with different pens and presumably in different writing posi-
tions, whereas the two will signatures were, whether legit or not, written one
immediately after the other with the same pen, so again the binomial model
would drastically overestimate the rarity of the event in question. Thus, as
throughout the book, this use of courtroom mathematics was overzealous:
very little should have been gleaned from Peirce’s impressive albeit fatally
flawed reasoning. Nonetheless, Peirce was an imposing intellectual figure and
his model was assumed accurate based on the aura of accuracy and intim-
idation surrounding mathematics: the signature was deemed a forgery and
the inheritance withheld. The legal deliberations of this case are not amply
explored in this chapter (one wishes the authors conducted a bit more re-
search in this direction), but presumably the court decision was indeed based
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heavily on this “expert” mathematical testimony, for little else remained.
In addition to Peirce’s altogether fascinating mathematical efforts—which,
although ultimately short of their goal, are more thoughtful and creative than
many of the shallow prosecutorial endeavors depicted in other chapters—and
the phenomenal literary intrigue permeating this story, this inheritance case
is particularly tantalizing for two reasons. As opposed to many of the other
cases in the book, there really is little ambiguity in interpreting this prob-
abilistic evidence. Had the statistical model been accurate, it seems fairly
reasonable to base a judicial decision on the probability thus obtained; per-
haps this is still an arguable point, but the interpretive nuances here are
certainly less than in the earlier cases of criminal identification. Addition-
ally, most of the cases in the book leave the reader feeling fairly confident
as to the reality of what transpired (another exception is the Amanda Knox
case, but more on this later). With regard to this potentially duplicitous
will, however, I remain completely divided about its veracity (and the class
I taught this material to was equally split) and wholly mesmerized by this
peculiar case. Moreover, unique to this story I felt that we might actually
be able to resolve the case correctly, after a century and a half, if we could
go back to the original evidence and use more sophisticated forensic and/or
mathematical methods, for instance incorporating extensive experimentally
verified statistics on hand-writing reproducibility. Alas, this sentiment is
likely as naive and quixotic as many of the ventures detailed in Math on
Trial ; this case will likely remain for eternity a mystery.
Much of the mathematical analysis found in this inheritance dispute chap-
ter comes from a delightful and well-written statistical paper [10], though the
Schneps and Colmez chapter rounds out the background material on this case
into a more full narrative and aims the discussion at a slightly wider audience.
More generally, even though many of the chapters in the book have previously
been analyzed through a mathematical lens in the literature, Math on Trial
fills an important niche by assembling these curious cases all in one place and
provides contextual and mathematical background rendering them accessible
to non-experts. The cumulative effect of these cases and their analysis in this
book is to leave the reader feeling informed yet simultaneously mystified over
the deeper implications—and both of these responses indicate, in my opin-
ion, a very successful and worthwhile publication. Indeed, the debate over
the applicability of math in the courtroom shall continue unabated, so it is
prudent that the authors here have focused more on raising awareness and
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resolving the concrete issues that they highlight than on attempting to set-
tle the broader, invariably controversial and perplexing, issues surrounding
statistical jurisprudence.
3. Some concerns
Having given a preview of the content of the book and a sense of its com-
position, I now turn to a somewhat more direct commentary. I first mention a
point which, while neither positive nor negative in its own right, is important
for the reader to keep in mind in order to properly contextualize the authors’
arguments. This is followed by a brief mention of the one overall weakness
of the book that I perceive. Finally, a list of specific, sometimes pedantic,
complaints are presented. These include, unfortunately, some surprisingly
elementary mathematical errors; teachers considering using this as a text-
book should pay especial attention here to ensure students are not confused.
It is somewhat disappointing that a professional mathematician would make
such basic errors, especially in a book whose premise is that with a little
thought, anyone is capable of detecting and preventing such errors. This just
amplifies the point that we—whether jurors in a trial with testimony from
expert witnesses, or readers of a book by expert mathematicians—should
avoid the temptation to simply rely on the credentials of the experts and
take the accuracy of their statements for granted; we should instead strive
to take responsibility for our own understanding of the ideas presented and
pro-actively think, question, and if necessary, repudiate. Since this is an
attitude advocated in the book itself, we can euphemistically say that these
minor mathematical mistakes in Math on Trial are simply opportunities to
put the authors’ message to work: check the math, find the errors, and don’t
be misled!
The general issue that I want readers to be aware of is one mentioned
briefly at the conclusion of the preceding section, namely, that the book tends
to focus on tangible, avoidable mathematical errors, rather than more funda-
mental questions of determining probative force, and practical administrative
protocol, for statistical evidence. This is important to keep in mind; failure
to do so can leave the reader with the false impression that by simply being
smarter when applying math in the courtroom we will avoid the potential
harm of statistical jurisprudence. Tribe has inveighed against this notion at
length [14]; whether one agrees with him or not, one must at least admit that
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this is a contentious debate that runs far deeper than mathematical literacy
and the lack thereof. That being said, the limited scope of the book in this
regard can, as remarked above, be viewed as a strength. Indeed, it prevents
the book from sinking heedlessly into a morass of polemics. Whether or not
quantitative reasoning has a place in the courtroom, it is safe to say that bad
quantitative reasoning never does, and this book unequivocally helps gird
us from a variety of instances of bad math. Thus, as long as one remains
cognizant of this limited scope and does not begin to naively think problems
as simple as confusing independent and dependent events are all that prevent
the judicial system from embracing the quantitative revolution, one will not
be led astray. In summary, one should view this book as a supplement to the
existing discourse on math in the courtroom, rather than a comprehensive
treatment of it.
The next general issue I wish the reader to be aware of is, as opposed to
the previous one, a genuine weakness of the book—although it is vastly out-
weighed by the overwhelmingly many strengths and features of the book, so
this criticism should not be taken too heavily. That being said, the authors’
lack of legal training and background is often plainly apparent. Perhaps
a collaboration between a mathematician and a legal scholar, rather than
two mathematicians, would have resulted in a more well-rounded analysis,
but again the shortcomings are manageable if one is willing to consult other
sources on the cases under discussion. Many of these cases involve legal in-
tricacies at least as complex, interesting, and important as the mathematical
ones, yet these are almost entirely untouched in the book. Admittedly, the
book is not intended as a work of legal scholarship, the emphasis really is on
the math, so perhaps this is an unfair complaint. But the problem is that the
two components, mathematical and judicial, are inextricably intertwined, so
by treating half of the story in a perfunctory manner we often see a not en-
tirely accurate representation of the role mathematical considerations really
played in these courtroom proceedings. More pointedly, it has been remarked
in another review of this book that in some of the cases discussed here the
mathematical arguments, although present in the case as described, had lit-
tle if any impact on the deliberations and legal ruling [4]. Thus, it is slightly
misleading to suggest that correcting the math errors will in turn correct the
judicial ones. Nonetheless, minimizing the number of math errors appearing
in courts can only improve the situation overall, and the legal superficiality
in this book does not curtail its success in this endeavor.
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I now turn to some specific items and passages in the book that seem
suspicious, unfairly biased, and in some cases simply erroneous. The first is
a subtle and rather inoffensive one: on page 10, to convey the fragility of
newborns the authors describe the infant morality rate in the 19th century as
“one hundred per thousand babies.” Although it appears standard to report
mortality rates in units of “per thousand,” in this particular case we find a
curious occurrence: this figure could have been stated in the mathematically
equivalent form of a reduced fraction, namely, “one in ten.” Even though
the numerical value is unchanged, the psychological impact of a figure like
this can take different forms depending on the choice of units. This is not
a criticism of the authors, it is simply an opportunity to observe that when
communicating mathematics—a science of precision which aims to be an ob-
jective and universal language—there inevitably are choices to make which
can influence the listener’s reaction and interpretation. It is tempting to
think of math as more immune to manipulation than other forms of reason-
ing, but in many respects it is not. This is relevant to the legal setting where
one’s goal is to deliberately sway the impact of evidence on the listener. Here
we see manifestly a very mild example: the prevailing conventions in the field
of public health, to use “per thousand” units, clashes with the convention in
mathematics to present fractions in reduced form; one could thus justifiably
adhere to either convention, and in doing so there is perhaps an opportunity
to nudge the reader’s emotional response in a particular direction based on
the form of the figure reported. The authors have missed a convenient op-
portunity here to address this simple point, though perhaps it is sufficiently
well-known that they did not feel a need to discuss it.
The next issue is the authors’ treatment of the Amanda Knox case in
Chapter 4. At the time this review was written, the vast majority of negative
reviews of the book on Amazon.com were primarily upset at this particular
chapter, and rightly so, I must admit. The authors here clearly have an
agenda and fall victim to the very thing they argue most strongly against
throughout the entire book: they attempt to use imposing mathematical
arguments to convince us of a defendant’s guilt, hoping the elegance of the
math will blind us to the multitude of countervailing factors relevant to the
trial. I need not explain why the details of their argument are so absurdly
illogical—this is a case that has been discussed and analyzed extensively
by so many others that the reader is simply suggested to read this chapter
as an exercise in applying the overall philosophy of the book: think for
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yourself, see through the attempted mathematical coercion, and don’t trust
the “experts,” especially when they are clearly only applying their statistical
methods to part of the story and ignoring all the evidence that invalidates
their mathematical findings. Before moving on, however, I shall point out an
example of the intense bias that pervades this chapter: one of the suspects,
Raffaele, is described as someone who is “shy” and “favored computer science,
violent manga, and knives.” There is no explanation of where this bizarre
and slanderous assertion came from (although Raffaele was an enthusiastic
chef, and indeed chefs value knives). I hope any shy computer scientists
reading this are as offended by this ridiculous passage as they should be.
Let us turn now to the actual math errors. One appears right in this
same Amanda Knox chapter, in the mathematical preamble. The follow-
ing situation is described: you are given one of two coins, a fair coin and a
weighted coin favoring heads 70% of the time, and you wish to determine,
based on the proportion of heads that occurs upon repeated tosses, the prob-
ability that the coin is the weighted one. The authors derive a probability
of 58% if the experiment is a single toss resulting in a heads. However, this
is incorrect: there is no well-defined answer to the question as phrased. A
simple application of Bayes’ Theorem reveals that if one assumes a flat prior
distribution—that is, half the time you are given the biased coin and half
the time you are given the fair coin—then indeed this is the correct poste-
rior probability upon seeing one heads. But the assumption is absolutely
crucial to even make sense of the question, so leaving it implicit is in bad
taste and incorrectly suggesting that it is unnecessary is far worse. This
is quite unfortunate as it demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of
Bayesian statistics on behalf of the authors, and one of the main approaches
to statistical jurisprudence suggested in the literature is predicated entirely
on Bayesian statistics [6]. So, reader be warned.
The next math error is perhaps even simpler and illustrates a mere slop-
piness on the part of the authors and the editor. On page 190, the authors
attempt to compute the probability that a die rolled six times will land on
the number six exactly three times. The correct answer is (1
6
)3(5
6
)3
(
6
3
) ∼= 5%,
corresponding to the fact that one needs to hit a particular number three
times, avoid this number three times, and that this can happen in any order
among the six rolls. This is about half the figure presented in the book; the
author’s error is that they left off the term (5
6
)3, so they have in fact com-
puted the probability of getting at least three sixes rather than exactly this
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many. A simple error, but a surprising one from a math professor writing a
book about how to avoid simple math errors.
Finally, not an error but a somewhat revealing passage: on page 105
the authors assert that Bayes’ Theorem is “used quite frequently in legal
situations” and they then proceed to estimate the probability of a defendant’s
guilt using this. Of course, anyone who has read Tribe’s influential work
[14] knows that Bayes’ Theorem is extraordinarily problematic in the legal
setting, and although there are on-going arguments about its applicability
and there have been a handful, perhaps even many, legal cases where Bayes’
Theorem has been employed, to assert without grounding that these instances
are “frequent” among all legal cases seems a fairly unscholarly exaggeration.
4. How and why to teach this topic
The subject of mathematics in the courtroom offers a wonderful pedagog-
ical opportunity for many reasons, and I am extremely grateful that the book
under review now exists so that the barriers-to-entry for teaching it are dras-
tically reduced. Firstly, most students who do not major in mathematics have
a false impression that being able to understand mathematical arguments of
any kind would require years of advanced study. On the contrary, the math-
ematics that has been used in the courtroom, and which is discussed in this
book, is elementary; not even calculus is required. Even though notions from
probability theory and statistics are used, one really needs only a minimal,
conceptual understanding to follow, and refute, the arguments—and this is
something I truly believe any college student can pick up during a semester
while going through these cases, regardless of mathematical background and
aptitude. This is empowering: students learn that rather than fearing math,
they can face it, dissect it, argue about it. Conquering one’s fear of math,
which this experience can contribute to, goes a long way toward helping one
learn math, since otherwise one faces the substantial impediment of untamed
anxiety.
Secondly, often students who do exhibit math phobias trace their anx-
iety and inability to understand math to the fact that the concepts are so
abstract and removed from real-world situations. By grounding the math-
ematical notions that arise in this book (statistical sampling, binomial co-
efficients, exponential growth, etc.) in the very real context of court cases,
students can anchor their understanding to concrete situations and see the
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abstract concepts in action. For instance, conditional probability and Bayes’
Theorem can be a challenge for some, treated as formulas to be memorized
without intuitive understanding; teaching an introductory course on statis-
tical jurisprudence provides one with the opportunity to explain the theory
of subjective probability [13] in terms of jurors’ willingness to bet on legal
outcomes and to view Bayes’ Theorem as a systematic way of revising one’s
probabilistic belief in an assertion based on the addition of new evidence.
We, the math educators, often attempt to motivate calculus through fairly
contrived examples, but here in the legal setting we can do better. Not
only are the examples anything but contrived (they are, after all, real cases
where the decisions determine the fate of individuals!), but we are not simply
illustrating calculus or any other particular topic, we are illustrating mathe-
matical reasoning more generally. I believe this is a unique and magnificent
educational opportunity.
Thirdly, roughly a quarter of all Americans will serve on a jury at some
point in their lives [3]. Since our students are no exception, it seems judicious
to prepare them for this judicial experience. Familiarity with mathematical
courtroom reasoning is only a tiny component of being an informed partici-
pant in the legal process, but every bit helps—and if nothing else, this offers
a way to get students from a broad range of backgrounds actively thinking
about legal issues.
These are just some of the reasons that come to mind to teach the topic
of Math on Trial ; in summary, it shows that math is both accessible and
relevant, and it raises the overall quantitative literacy of our students and
exposes them to fascinating judicial matters which many might otherwise
overlook in their education. There are surely more reasons than this, but
allow me to turn now to the next question: once you decide to teach this
topic—whether in a freshman seminar (as I have recently done) or as a spe-
cial topics math major course or anything in between—what concrete steps
should you take to use and perhaps supplement the book under review?
To begin with, the division of the book into individual cases, prefaced
with simple math lessons, lends itself quite naturally to the classroom. Each
case can be read on its own, and if the class is not aimed at math majors
then the instructor can supplement the math lessons as appropriate. It is
essentially guaranteed that a robust conversation amongst the students will
be possible if so desired. More ambitious pedagogical options are available
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too; for instance, the class can be split into groups, and when a particular
case is discussed two groups could be assigned to it, one the defense and one
the prosecution, and class time could then be used as a sort of mock trial.
The chapters sometimes reference each other, thus providing a nice unity
to the book, but nonetheless it would not be difficult to teach a course us-
ing only a selection of the chapters, and to reorder them if so inclined. For
some of the chapters the instructor may prefer to use an original source on
the mathematical analysis, especially if a slightly higher level of discussion
is sought. For instance, for the disputed will case there is [10], and for the
Dreyfus affair there is [9]. An engaging assignment one could build into
the course is to have students, individually or in groups, find legal cases
not discussed in the book where math played a role and then analyze these
cases using the ideas and methods discussed and accumulated throughout the
semester. One of my students wrote a report on the famous O.J. Simpson
trial, since an argument was made there concerning the conditional prob-
ability (empirically obtained) that a murder committed was by a former
lover given a history of domestic abuse in the erstwhile relationship. Con-
veniently, there is a consortium called Bayes and the Law which hosts an
extensive webpage listing legal cases that involved probabilistic reasoning
(https://sites.google.com/site/bayeslegal/). This is a marvelous re-
source for students looking to find cases to write about, or for instructors
looking to broaden or customize their curriculum.
With these suggestions in mind, I turn now to what I view as the most
important piece of curricular advice, which is that the original Harvard Law
Review debate referenced in the introduction is absolutely indispensable to
a well-rounded course on statistical jurisprudence. I am undecided as to
whether it is better to begin with these papers and then turn to Math on
Trial or to do the reverse. The papers are more difficult to read, which
suggests postponing them might be best, but they frame the material so
beautifully that one might gain more from the book having first seen the big
picture presented in the papers. Since these papers are in essence a sequence
of rebuttals, it might work to start with [6], which advocates using Bayesian
methods in the courtroom, then do Tribe’s monumental [14] which directly
confronts this suggestion and reaches quite the opposite conclusion, then
proceed to Math on Trial to get more concrete cases under one’s belt, then
return to [7, 15] to see the academic debate continue. If one has time only for
one paper beyond the book, I recommend it be [14]. This paper thoughtfully
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lays out the entire landscape of mathematics in the courtroom and has been
influential for decades since—although it certainly isn’t the final word on the
matter, nor should one feel obligated to agree with it. There is also the nice
paper [8] written by Kaye eight years after the Harvard papers which adds
an important dimension to the debate.
Throughout the course, whatever the structure one chooses and exact
sequence of cases/papers one selects, I think it is important to keep the dis-
course lively and provide ample room for the students to debate and question
everything. This should not be taught like most math courses, in a standard
lecture format. There is room for plenty of helpful lectures, but like the le-
gal profession itself, this material lives through debate and should be taught
accordingly.
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